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Abstract: 
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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen studerer effektene av en endring i finansieringssystemet for norske sykehus. I 2010 
ble sykehusenes kompensasjon for dagbehandling drastisk redusert, mens kompensasjonen for 
døgnbehandling ble økt. Dette ga sykehusene insentiver til å flytte pasienter fra dagbehandling til 
døgnbehandling, eller til å redusere antall dagbehandlinger. Slike tilpasninger til økonomiske 
insentiver kan ha konsekvenser både for offentlige finanser og for pasienters helse. Artikkelen utnytter 
variasjon mellom diagnosegrupper i størrelsen på marginalgevinsten av å legge inn pasienten for å 
undersøke om sykehus responderer på insentivendringene.  Resultatene viser at sykehus ikke 
responderer på endringene i insentiver, og det ser ikke ut til at mangel på ledige sengeplasser forklarer 
hvorfor pasienter ikke flyttes fra dagbehandling til døgnbehandling. Disse funnene indikerer at dagens 
finansieringsmodell gir lite rom for at økonomiske insentiver kan påvirke behandlingsvalg og 
ressursbruk i helsetjenesten. 
1 Introduction
Escalating healthcare spending constitutes one of the largest fiscal challenges facing gov-
ernments in developed countries, and supply side factors have gained increased atten-
tion as the main driver (see, e.g. Anthony et al., 2009; Skinner, 2012; Chandra et al.,
2012; Finkelstein et al., 2016).1 As choice of payment policy might have consequences for
both spending and patient health, it is a pressing empirical task to study how healthcare
providers’ incentives influence the care they provide.
Healthcare providers have private information about a patient’s need for treatment and
the quality thereof. The payer, either an insurer or the patient herself, needs to formulate
incentives for providers to supply high-quality care at minimum costs. Healthcare systems
around the world, from Medicare in the U.S. to national health services in England and
Norway, often employ partially prospective payment schedules in which prices are set as
the average costs across all patients admitted for a certain diagnosis (i.e. DRG prices).
Though such contracts may stimulate both efficiency and quality, distortion effects may
arise from the wedge between hospital payment and actual costs.
This paper examines how hospitals respond to price changes. An important challenge
when studying price responses is that prices are typically adjusted to reflect changes in
treatment costs. Hence, any observed changes in prices likely reflect a reverse causality
between care intensity and prices. To address such endogeneity concerns, I rely on two
features of the reimbursement scheme for hospitals in Norway. First, as payments are
calculated based on costs from 2-3 years back, price changes are unlikely to reflect concur-
rent changes in treatment costs. Second, I exploit variation from a policy change in 2010
which substantially affected the payments, but did not reflect changing costs. Before the
policy change, payment was independent of the subsequent length of stay. After the policy
change, providers are paid a considerably lower amount for stays wherein the patient is
discharged on the day of admission. At the second day after admission there is a large,
approximately $2000 on average, increase in payments for keeping a patient an additional
day, but no payments for any days beyond it.2 The size of the marginal payment for the
second day varies significantly across diagnosis groups; one standard deviation amounts to
about $1200. The new payment scheme thus creates incentives for hospitals to decrease
the admission of one-day stays (extensive margin), or to shift patients from one-day stays
to two-day stays, provided that the marginal revenue exceeds the marginal cost of the
additional day (intensive margin). In addition, hospitals may be inclined to prioritize the
more profitable patient groups.
I start out by examining whether patients are, on average, more likely to stay longer
than one day following the policy change. This has the intuitive appeal that hospitals may
1Over the period 2000 to 2016, health spending has risen from 12.5 percent of GDP to more than 17
percent in the U.S (OECD, 2017). Many European countries have experienced equally striking increases
in health spending: from 6 percent to 9.7 percent in the U.K. and from 7.7 percent to 10.5 percent in
Norway.
2Prices are measured in 2012-levels. Throughout the paper I assume a currency rate NOK/USD=8.
Numbers are calculated in the estimation sample.
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respond to the new payment scheme without considering the magnitude of the marginal
payments. Next, I investigate whether hospitals respond differently by the size of the
marginal payments. To this end, I employ a difference-in-differences model to compare
admissions within diagnoses subject to large price changes to admissions within diagnoses
subject to small price changes. Any response to the payment scheme may depend on
whether the hospital is facing capacity constraints. I therefore additionally investigate
whether hospitals with a lower bed occupancy rate are more likely to respond.
The Norwegian healthcare system provides an attractive context for this study for sev-
eral reasons. A first advantage of the Norwegian context is the publicly financed healthcare
system, which is reflective of the systems in place throughout Europe, as well as in Canada.
In light of marked differences across institutional settings, in terms of hospital ownership
and physician remuneration, one might expect to see different effects of similar changes
in financial incentives. Reliable causal estimates of price changes are, however, somewhat
sparse, and among the notable exceptions, many are set in the U.S. Nonetheless, this
literature finds mixed evidence for effects on volume and medical care intensity, including
the length of a hospital stay, but generally finds small or no effects on patient outcomes
(see, e.g. Dafny, 2005; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014; Allen et al., 2016; Verzulli et al., 2017;
Brekke et al., 2017; Einav et al., 2018).3
A second advantage of the Norwegian context is the availability of high quality data.
The paper draws on data from administrative registers which include all visits financed
by the Norwegian public healthcare system. The unusually rich data comprise complete
patient level observations of diagnoses, procedures, admission and discharge times. This
allows me to construct detailed patient outcomes, as well as measures of hospitals’ capac-
ity constraints. The measure of capacity leverages variation across hospitals in the bed
occupancy rate, emerging from the combination of bed capacity and patient congestion.
An important contribution of this paper is to account for the marginal costs arising
from capacity constraints. Studies of hospital behavior under capacity constraints are
rarely seen within the literature despite the possibility that capacity may be binding and
hence affect the price response.4 If the marginal costs of more treatment are non-negligible,
estimated price effects will resemble responses to changes in revenue and not changes in
profits. These alternatives may have different policy implications. For example, small or
absent price responses could be due to hospitals’ ethical concerns or preferences for patient
welfare, but lack of responses could also be explained by insufficient monetary payoff.
I concentrate on patients admitted for any orthopedic surgery. These admissions are
subject to sharp variation in provider incentives, and they account for about one third of
3Clemens and Gottlieb (2014); Allen et al. (2016); Einav et al. (2018) find positive effects of price
changes on medical care intensity, while Dafny (2005); Verzulli et al. (2017) find no evidence. Clemens
and Gottlieb (2014) and Dafny (2005) find no or little impact on volume, while Januleviciute et al. (2016);
Verzulli et al. (2017); Brekke et al. (2017); Liang (2015) find positive volume effects. Of these papers,
Allen et al. (2016); Januleviciute et al. (2016); Verzulli et al. (2017); Brekke et al. (2017) study a European
setting.
4Verzulli et al. (2017) is one exception. They study price changes in Italy, and find smaller price effects
for hospitals with lower excess capacity.
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all surgeries in Norway. The focus on one specialty at the hospital allows me to study
admissions that are likely subject to the same personnel and bed constraints. In addition,
orthopedic patients are often relatively healthy and have fewer multiconditions, which
make them more likely to be on the length of stay margin affected by the payment scheme
changes.
The main findings of this paper may be summarized along the following lines. I do
not find any evidence that the 2010-policy change increased the overall probability of
patients staying longer than one day. One explanation for the absent response may be
that the average masks differential responses across patient groups. For example, patients
in less profitable diagnosis groups may be discharged, or not admitted, to free up beds or
personnel for patients in more profitable diagnosis groups. Nonetheless, when comparing
diagnosis groups subject to large price changes to groups subject to low price changes, I
find no discernible differences in the volume of admitted patients. The absence of extensive
margin effects through volume and hence patient composition allow me to interpret the
estimated probability to stay longer than one day as an intensive margin effect. However,
I find no evidence that hospitals are more likely to shift patients from one-day stays to
two-day stays within diagnosis groups for which the marginal revenue of the second day
is the highest. Capacity constraints may be flagged as one potential explanation for the
absence of any price response, as a substantial share of the hospital beds in Norway are
filled at any given day, and wait times are generally high (OECD, 2015).5 However, when
comparing hospitals with high pre reform bed occupancy rates to hospitals with lower bed
occupancy rates, the results lend no support to the hypothesis that capacity constraints
impede hospitals’ shifting of patients into longer stays. Finally, given the absence of
response on the length of stay, it is unsurprising that I find no evidence that price changes
affect patient health.
I conclude that, within the context studied, hospitals are notably insensitive to prices.
Effects are precisely estimated, allowing me to discard effect sizes of any economic im-
portance. These findings suggest less concern for perverse incentives and crowding-out
of hospitals’ motivation, at least within healthcare systems similar to that of Norway.
Nonetheless, the results imply that the current payment policy yields little scope for pol-
icymakers to affect the healthcare spending and treatment choices.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
setting, and explains the payment system and the policy change. Section 3 lays out the
empirical strategy. Data, sample and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4.
Sections 5 and 6 present and discusses the results.
5According to OECD, 90% of hospitals bed in Norway are filled on any given day. In comparison, the
average share of beds filled in the OECD is 80% (OECD, 2015). Another signal of capacity constraints
is the long wait times, for example, average wait time for hip replacement was 152 days in 2014 (Godøy
et al., 2017)
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2 Institutional setting and policy change
2.1 Institution and payment scheme
Norway has a universal, single-payer healthcare system, in which specialist care is primarily
funded by a compulsory national insurance scheme.6 The reimbursement scheme from the
national level to regional health authorities entails a fixed part and an activity-based part.7
Provided that certain financial criteria are met, the regional health authorities are free to
further allocate funding to the health trusts and contract specialists within their region.
There are no clear guidelines for distribution of funding to lower levels (NOU, 2008), but
in practice activity-based financing trickles down to the hospital level, and even to the
departmental level within hospitals (Helsedirektoratet, 2007; Riksrevisjonen, 2014).
Physicians at hospitals are paid by a fixed salary, which is not directly connected to
hospital reimbursement rates. A salaried physician may nevertheless have a motivation
to internalize hospital incentives if it pays back indirectly, for instance by increasing the
physician’s bargaining power, by improving future job prospects, or by allowing for more
comfortable working conditions.8 Several physicians have expressed concern over the per-
verse incentives implied by the hospital payment scheme, as illustrated by an op-ed by
Lieng et al. (2013) published in the Journal of the Norwegian Medical Association. This
may suggest that hospital incentives are at least partially embedded in the decision-making
process of the clinicians.
Activity-based financing using diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is a central feature of
the reimbursement scheme for hospitals in Norway. Patients discharged at a somatic hos-
pital are assigned a diagnosis group, where groups comprise patients who are homogeneous
in medical criteria and costs of treatment. Each diagnosis group is assigned a cost weight
which reflects the average costs of treating a patient within that group, relative to all other
patients. Hospitals are reimbursed based on this cost weight regardless of the actual costs
incurred in treating the patient. More specifically, the hospital receives the diagnosis-
specific weight (wjt) multiplied by the average costs of treating any patient at a somatic
hospital (c¯t−2) and the share of activity based financing (ABFt): pjt = wjt× c¯t−2×ABFt.
Cost estimations are based on average costs of a sample of hospitals. National average
treatment costs are revised regularly, and there is a time lag of two to three years for
6Some services, such as outpatient admissions and visits to primary care physicians are subject to small
co-payment rates. In 2015, the out-of-pocket payment rate for an outpatient procedure was approximately
40USD. However, once a patient’s yearly total out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures exceed about 260USD
all further expenses within that calendar year are reimbursed.
Since 2001, patients who are referred to specialist health care have had the right to choose the hospital
at which they want to receive treatment. Patients may choose to be treated at hospitals outside of their
catchment area; either at another health trust within their region or in another region, but the latter is
infrequently observed.
7The activity-based part has been varying since its introduction, starting at 30 percent in 1997 and
oscillating between 40 and 60 in the mid-2000s to finally stabilize at 40 percent in 2006. Activity-based
part in percent by year: 1997: 30, 2003: 60, 2004: 40, 2005: 60, 2006-2014: 40, 2015: 50. Investments and
geographic and demographic differences between regions are covered by a capitation adjusted block grant.
8These arguments are confirmed in informal discussions with hospital physicians and health personnel.
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changes in costs to be reflected in price changes.9
2.2 2010-Policy change
Diagnosis-specific reimbursement rates were initially independent of the length of a pa-
tient’s hospital stay. In 2010, the reimbursement rates for each surgical diagnosis group
were split into pairs, yielding one rate for stays lasting longer than one day, and one rate
for stays lasting one day only. The intention was to make the diagnosis groups more
homogeneous in costs, and to remove financial incentives to discharge patients too early
(SAMDATA, 2012). In the calculation of new rates, the total set of diagnosis-specific
prices was recalibrated so that the total sum of diagnosis group weights produced in 2010
would correspond to that of 2009, given the activity level (and behavior) in 2009 (Helsedi-
rektoratet, 2010, 2011a).10
At the outset, note that the change in average payments per diagnosis group is minor;
the reform was budget neutral, and primarily affected the marginal payments within each
group. Figure 1 illustrates the payment schemes before and after the policy change. Before
the policy change, payment was prospective given the patient diagnosis and hospitals
were reimbursed by a fixed price per admission (approximately p = $3200 on average),
independent of the length of stay or the treatment intensity. After the policy change,
hospitals receive on average p = $1500 upon admission. On the second day since the day
of admission, the payment scheme exhibits a threshold, at which point there is a large
(approximately $2000 on average, or p − p) increase in payments for keeping a patient
for one additional day, but no payments for any subsequent days beyond the threshold.
Figure 1 describes the average change in the marginal revenue (p−p) caused by the reform.
There is also substantial variation between diagnosis groups; this variation will be taken
to the data. In Section A3 I formalize the price incentives along the intensive margin, and
discuss implications of heterogeneous marginal costs.
3 Empirical strategy
This section describes the empirical methods used to examine the response to the new
payment scheme. When payments upon admission decrease while the marginal revenue at
the second day increases, hospitals may respond by shifting patients from one-day stays
to two-day stays (intensive margin) or by lowering the volume of one-day stays (extensive
margin). Both responses will lead to an increase in the estimated probability of patients
staying longer than one day.11 I therefore start out by exploring the policy induced change
in the overall probability of staying longer than one day. This has the intuitive appeal
that hospitals may respond to the new payment scheme without considering the size of
9Prices in 2012 were based on costs from 2010; prices in 2011 from cost data in 2009; 2010 (2007); 2009
(2007) and 2008 (2006). Weights are also updated annually if grouping structure etc has changed.
10See Section A1 for more details on how the new weights were calibrated.
11Intuitively, any extensive margin response will affect the probability of staying longer than one day
by entering through the denominator.
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Figure 1: Incentives before and after policy change.
Light dotted line illustrates the hospitals payment scheme before the policy change; darker long-dashed
line represents the payment scheme after the policy change. Before the policy change, cumulative payment
per patient is not a function of days at the hospital, and payment is fixed at p. After the policy change,
cumulative payment is p upon admission, and changes discretely, to p, on the second day since the day of
admission. Prices are weighted by the number of admissions in pre-policy year 2009.
the marginal payment. Hospital managers may find it difficult to communicate incentives
to the physicians, and perhaps in particular if physicians do not earn the exact size of
the marginal payment. Managers may therefore prefer to send a simpler message to their
physicians to increase the length of stay by one day across all diagnosis groups.
I next test whether the decision makers consider the size of the marginal payment. To
this end, I formulate a difference-in-differences model and compare patients in diagnosis
groups subject to large price changes with groups subject to smaller price changes.
3.1 Average response to policy change
Studying average responses to the policy reform is challenging since everyone is affected
by the price change, rendering no single control group. Instead, I compare the pre and
post policy outcomes in a simple model:
yijkt = αpostt + βyeart + γjk + εijkt, (3.1)
where yijkt is either a binary variable equal to one if the patient stays longer than one
day at the hospital, or the log number of admissions.12 The indicator postt is equal to
12When estimating volume effects, the data are collapsed to cells of hospital-diagnosis-year
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one in all years ≥2010, and yeart is either a linear or quadratic time trend.13 Hospital by
diagnosis fixed effects (γjk) control for time invariant characteristics in diagnosis groups
within hospitals, and flexibly allow for heterogeneity in the case-mix offered at different
hospitals. If the probability of staying longer than one day increases following the policy
change, I expect α > 0. If hospitals respond by decreasing the number of one-day stays,
this would yield a negative impact on the total volume.
3.2 Response by magnitude of marginal payments
I next study whether the payment change differentially affected the probability of one-day
stays in diagnosis groups that were subject to large price changes compared to diagnosis
groups subject to smaller price changes. Any potential effect on staying longer than
one day may be a result of both extensive and intensive margin responses. I therefore
additionally estimate the effect on the number of admitted patients. Absent effects along
the extensive margin may indicate that any potential effect on staying longer than one
day is driven by the intensive margin.
To study effects of price changes, I estimate the following regression model:
yijkt = αHighPricej × postt + δt + γjk + εijkt, (3.2)
where HighPricej is a binary variable taking the value one when the change in the
marginal revenue at the second day is above the median (p − p in Section 2.2). If pa-
tients admitted in high price groups are more likely to spend longer than one day at the
hospital, we would expect α > 0.14
All unobserved characteristics that may influence the outcome variable are captured
by the idiosyncratic error term εijkt, and this error term is assumed uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables. Standard errors are clustered at the diagnosis group level. To avoid
overstating the significance of the findings due to few clusters (20 in total), I calculate p-
values and 95% confidence intervals using the wild bootstrap (Cameron and Miller, 2015;
Roodman, 2015).15
The main assumption in any difference-in-differences model is that, absent the policy
change, trends in outcomes would evolve similarly across groups. This can be investigated
directly in an event-study model where the postt indicator is replaced by separate year
13This model bears close similarities to a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which yields similar
results. The main reason for not using RD as the main approach is that RD may be less ideal if effects
occur with some lags, e.g. if it takes time for the hospitals to learn about the new incentives.
14Note that the year fixed effects effectively purge out any average impact of the payment change.
Instead, the model offers insights into whether providers respond differently according to the amount to
be gained. If providers respond to the incentive but do so independently of size of the marginal payments
across diagnosis groups, this will not be picked up in the models. However, such overall responses will be
captured in the aforementioned model of Equation (3.1).
15I cluster at the diagnosis group level because this is the ”assignment” level for the price variation.
When not exploiting the heterogeneity in price incentives, as in Equations (3.1) and (3.3), I cluster at
the hospital level. However, results are similar when clustering at diagnosis level, hospital level, or when
clustering two-ways, i.e. taking into account the correlation between hospitals and diagnosis groups.
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dummies and the treatment indicator is estimated for each year (relative to pre-reform
year 2009).
3.3 Capacity constraints
The final model is motivated by the notion that hospitals often operate at high capacity.
Hospitals can only induce longer stays if they have spare capacity to accommodate the
patient. To test the hypothesis that capacity constraints may be binding, I group hospitals
by their pre policy change bed occupancy rate and formulate an alternative difference-in-
differences model:
yijkt = αExcessCapacityk × postt + δt + γjk + εijkt, (3.3)
where ExcessCapacityk is a binary variable equal to one if the orthopedic unit at hospital
k operated below the median bed occupancy rate prior to the payment change.
If hospitals with spare capacity are more likely to respond to the policy change, we
expect α > 0. Standard errors are clustered at the hospital level.
4 Data, sample and descriptives
The empirical analysis is based on data obtained from the Norwegian Patient Registry
(NPR). The registry contains complete patient level observations from all public hospitals
as well as private providers contracting with regional health authorities in Norway.16 From
2008 onwards, records contain patient identifiers that can be linked to administrative data
of the entire resident population in Norway. The patient data include information on
primary and secondary diagnoses (ICD10), surgical/medical procedures (NCSP/NCMP),
exact time, date and place of admissions and discharges, diagnosis-related groups and cost
weights.
The estimation sample includes all surgical orthopedic admissions in the NPR data
over the period 2008 to 2012.17,18 Orthopedics is by far the largest branch of surgery,
comprising about one third of all surgical admissions, both in terms of volume and rev-
enue.19 I include both elective and emergency admissions, as they are both subject to
the new payment scheme.20 Some diagnosis groups are aggregated to avoid compositional
16Very few providers operate as for-profit institutions without any contract with public health authori-
ties. The volume of such activity is not known, but is thought to be extremely low.
17I use orthopedics as shorthand for the Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) 8 “Diseases and Disorders
of the Musculoskeletal System And Connective Tissue”. MDCs are formed by dividing all DRGs into 30
mutually exclusive diagnosis areas that each correspond to a single organ system.
18Following a report by the Norwegian Directorate of Health (Helsedirektoratet, 2012), I discard admis-
sions to the emergency departments in Bergen and Oslo due to missing or wrong reporting to the NPR.
This does not appreciably affect the results.
19Calculation of revenue is based on data from 2009 (pre-reform). In comparison, the second biggest
MDC, Diseases in the Circulatory system, generated 14% of the surgical revenue in the same year.
20Results from a sample of elective surgeries only yields the same conclusion as for the full sample (see
Appendix Tables A4.6 and A4.7).
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Figure 2: Variation in price changes and bed occupancy rate.
Panel (a) shows the variation across diagnosis groups in marginal revenue at the second day. Panel (b)
shows the variation across hospitals in the pre-reform bed occupancy rate (patients/beds). Higher bed
occupancy rates represent lower excess capacity.
changes over the study period - I use the phrase ’diagnosis groups’ as shorthand for these
aggregated groups despite the slight imprecision.21
The main explanatory variable is an indicator based on the marginal payment at the
second day. This marginal payment is defined as the difference in payments between two-
day stays and one-day stays (p − p). The variation across diagnosis groups is illustrated
in Figure 2a. The sample mean marginal revenue of shifting a patient from one-day stays
to two-day stays is $2025, and the standard deviation is $1232. Median is $1452.
When examining whether the policy response depends on the bed capacity, I group
admissions by a measure of the pre-reform bed occupancy rate at the hospital’s orthopedic
surgery unit. The bed occupancy rate is calculated by, for each day, dividing the volume
of hospitalized patients by the number of beds. As I do not have data on the number of
beds at the specialty level, the bed stock is approximated by the yearly maximum number
of patients hospitalized from one day to the next.22 The very few admissions to hospitals
with no beds are given a maximum bed occupancy rate. The variation across hospitals is
shown in Figure 2b. The mean bed occupancy rate is about 0.53, while the median is 0.55
and the standard deviation 0.26.
21Included DRGs are listed below, where DRGs within parenthesis are grouped together: (209A, 209B,
209O), (210, 211, 212, 212O), (213, 213O), (214A, 214B, 214C, 215B, 215C, 215O), (216, 216O), (217,
217O), (218, 219, 220, 220O), (221, 222, 222O, 222P), (223, 223O), (224, 224O), (225, 225O), (226, 227,
227O), (228, 228O), (229, 229O), (230, 230O), (231, 231O), (232, 232O), (233, 234, 234O), (471, 471N),
(491, 491O)
22This assumes that hospital units operate at maximum capacity at least once during a year. Results
do not change appreciably if I instead set the number of beds at 95% of the maximum. In an alternative
specification, I construct the capacity measure at the hospital - rather than specialty - level. This approach
may be preferred if specialties can borrow beds from other departments whenever needed. However, results
from this model are similar to those presented.
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Figure 3: Total admissions and share staying longer than one day.
Panel (a): Histogram shows the number of admissions per year. Connected dots illustrate the yearly share
of patients staying longer than one day. Panel (b): Share of patients staying longer than one day by
high/low price change groups.
Figure 3a shows that the overall volume of patients has increased throughout the
period, while the average share of patients staying longer than one day has decreased.
Though we would expect an increase in the latter if hospitals responded to the policy
change, it is also worth noting that technological progress works in the opposite direction,
towards shorter hospital stays. When splitting the sample by admissions to high vs. low
price groups as in Figure 3b, it seems that the trends have evolved fairly synchronized
over time. These trends will be examined more thoroughly in the empirical section.
The rest of the sample is described in Appendix A2.
5 Results
5.1 Average response
I begin the presentation of results by discussing the overall effect on the probability of
patients staying longer than one day. Figure 3 indicated descriptively that any policy
induced change in the probability of staying longer than one day is at maximum modest.
This picture is reiterated in Figure A4.1, where I plot the probability of staying longer
than one day purged of hospital by diagnosis fixed effects. More precisely, the figure plots
the residuals after a regression of a binary indicator for staying longer than one day on
hospital-diagnosis fixed effects. Although there might be indications that the trend is
flattening out, there is no sign of any abrupt increase in 2010, despite the large financial
incentives. In Table 1 I show that the estimate of the post indicator from Equation (3.1)
is almost zero, in fact marginally negative with a point estimate of -0.007. The estimate
is quite precise, and effect sizes larger than 0.008 can be rejected at a 95% significance
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Table 1: Effects of policy change on patient stays longer than one day
Length of stay>1 day
(1) (2) (3)
Post -0.007 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Linear time trend X X X
Quadratic time trend X X
Patient controls X
Dep. mean 0.545 0.545 0.545
N 546,383 546,383 546,383
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.1). All models include fixed effects for hospital-diagnosis.
Linear time trend is included in column (1), quadratic time trend is included in column (2), and patient
age, gender and the number of secondary diagnoses are included in column (3). Robust standard errors
clustered at hospital level in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
level. The estimate decreases somewhat when allowing for a quadratic time trend. Now,
estimates higher than 0.006 percentage points can be rejected at a 95% significance level.
Adding patient controls does not seem to affect the point estimate, which suggests that
hospitals do not start attracting a different type of patients, which would have biased the
estimate. The effect on the log volume is likewise minimal and non-significant, with point
estimates ranging from -0.042 to -0.052 (see Table A4.1). Taken together, there is strong
evidence of no average response to the new payment schedule.
5.2 Response by magnitude of marginal payments
The absence of any increase at the time of the reform may hide heterogeneous responses
across groups, for example due to capacity constraints. For instance, hospitals may retain
fewer patients in low price groups in order to free up beds for patients admitted to groups
subject to high price changes, rendering a zero average effect.
I continue by presenting results from the event-study equivalent to Equation (3.2).
Figure 4a serves two purposes: one is to test the identifying assumption of there being
no trends in the outcome variable prior to the reform; the second is to give a visual
presentation of any potential effect. The effect of high relative to low price changes is
estimated for each year relative to 2009. The figure displays no systematic pattern before
the policy change, lending support to the specification described by Equation (3.2).
A second takeaway from Figure 4a is that the effect of a high price change on staying
longer than one day is not significantly different from a low price change. This result is
further quantified in Table 2 where I present results from Equation (3.2). Column (1)
shows that patients subject to higher price changes are slightly more likely to stay longer
than one day, but the estimate is small and non-significant (0.01). The effect size decreases
when controlling for diagnosis-specific time trends in column (2). This is easiest explained
by Figure A4.2 which plots the residualized outcome over years separately for low and
14
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Figure 4: Probability of staying longer than one day – by size of price change and bed
capacity.
Panel (a) plots the event study estimate of high price changes, while panel (b) shows the event study
estimates for excess capacity. Both models include year and hospital-diagnosis fixed effects.
Table 2: Effects of price changes on patient stays longer than one day
Length of stay>1 day
(1) (2) (3)
HighPrice× post 0.011 0.005 0.014
95% CI [-0.009, 0.031] [-0.011, 0.023] [-0.005, 0.033]
p-value 0.27 0.55 0.15
Linear DRG time trend X
Patient controls X
Observations 546,383 546,383 546,383
Dependent mean 0.545 0.545 0.545
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2). Table shows the effect of high price changes (above
vs below median price change) on staying longer than one day at the hospital. All models include fixed
effects for year and hospital-diagnosis. Diagnosis-specific time trends are included in column (2), and
controls for age, gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). P-values and 95% confidence intervals
are calculated by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild bootstrap method (Cameron and
Miller, 2015; Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
high price change groups. The figure reveals a slight upward pre-trend in the high price
group, which will bias the effect estimate from column (1) upwards. When taking account
of this small pre-trend, the point estimate falls to 0.005, still non-significant.
In Table A4.2 I show that results are robust to alternative treatment indicators. This
includes comparing only admissions to the top and bottom price group quartiles, and
including the price change variable linearly. None of the models find any significant effects
of price changes on the probability of staying longer than one day.
Table A4.3 presents evidence that price changes do not appear to have affected the
volume of patients either. The estimated effect of high price changes on the log volume of
patients is small (0.5%) and non-significant.
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Table 3: Effects of policy change on patient stays longer than one day by bed capacity
Length of stay>1 day
(1) (2) (3)
ExcessCapacity × post -0.011 -0.021 -0.012
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
Linear hospital time trend X
Patient controls X
Observations 546,383 546,383 546,383
Dependent mean 0.545 0.545 0.545
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.3). Table shows the effect of the policy change for admissions
to hospitals with excess capacity relative to admissions to hospitals with lower capacity (below vs above
median bed occupancy rate) on staying longer than one day at the hospital. All models include fixed
effects for year and hospital-diagnosis. Hospital-specific time trends are included in column (2). Robust
standard errors clustered at the hospital level; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
5.3 Capacity constraints
Binding capacity constraints may prevent hospitals from retaining any type of patients,
regardless of the size of the price incentives. Figure 4b shows the event study equivalent
of Equation (3.3), where I group hospitals by their pre reform capacity rate. There does
not appear to be any differential trends in the probability to stay longer than one day in
the years before the policy change, lending support to the difference-in-differences model.
Moreover, there does not seem to be any indications that hospitals with relatively high
spare capacity are more likely to shift patients into longer stays following the policy change.
This finding is consistent with the difference-in-differences estimates presented in Table
3, which are modestly negative and non-significant. There is also no indications of any
volume effects, but precision is low (see Table A4.5).
5.4 Patient health
Since the policy change did not seem to shift patients into longer stays, health outcomes
cannot be impacted through an increase in the length of stay. Health outcomes may,
however, be directly affected through other channels, e.g. if hospitals compromise on
quality to avoid incurring financial losses from the policy change. To test this, I use the
model in Equation (3.2) to estimate the effect of price changes on patient health indicators.
The overall finding is that price changes do not carry over to patient health, but precision
is fairly low across all models. Results are presented in Table A4.4.23
23The indicators for in-hospital complications, infections and sentinel events all have low sample means,
for which linear probability models are known to perform poorly. Nonetheless, when alternatively using a
logit model, effects are minor and still non-significant.
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6 Discussion
A thorough understanding of how providers respond to incentives is crucial for policy
makers to affect costs and ultimately patient welfare. In this paper I show that, within
the Norwegian healthcare system, hospitals are notably insensitive to price incentives.
Capacity constraints seem unlikely to be the reason for the absence of any response.
This was formally examined in the model described in Equation (3.3), where I grouped
hospitals by their pre-reform capacity constraints. In this model, capacity was depending
on a time invariant measure of bed capacity. In an alternative model, I have also examined
time-variant measures of capacity, where the capacity measure is allowed to vary within
hospitals at a daily basis. This model brought the same conclusion as the one presented:
capacity constraints do not seem to explain the absent price response.24
High marginal costs form one potential explanation for why hospitals do not appear
to respond to price changes. Even if the marginal costs resembled by the bed occupancy
rate do not seem to be a driving force, there could be other marginal costs, such as for
personnel and equipment. This story seems however unlikely: since 2012, municipalities
are by law required to pay hospitals $500 per night for medical patients who are ready
to be discharged from the hospital but are not yet offered a bed at a nursing home. To
the extent that these marginal costs are generalizable to surgical patients at the one-day
margin, there is a sufficient profit margin to be gained - recall that the average marginal
revenue was around $2000.25
A theoretical model predicting hospital behavior would likely include a parameter
that captures physician morale or ethics. Physician ethics is a possible explanation for
the absence of price response if, pre reform, patients were already staying the optimal
length. In this case, staying longer at a hospital may worsen the patient outcomes, e.g.
through the risk of contracting hospital infections, or simply because individuals prefer
shorter hospital stays. Under the assumption that the welfare gain of a second day at the
hospital is negligible or negative, the findings are consistent with hospital objectives that
value patient welfare sufficiently more than revenues.
A final explanation for no price response could be that the actual decision maker -
the clinician - is unconnected to the incentives of the hospital. As explained in Section 2,
physicians at hospitals are paid by a fixed salary, whereas the price changes studied are at
the hospital level. Meanwhile, there are several examples of physicians who express worry
about the perverse financial incentives (see, e.g. Lieng et al., 2013), and Januleviciute et al.
(2016) find that Norwegian hospitals indeed respond to (relatively small) price incentives.
It thus seems likely that hospital incentives, at least to some extent, trickle down to the
decision making level. Nevertheless, if physician incentives are only partly related to the
24If hospitals with no excess capacity have by construction no way to respond to the new payment
scheme, the model in Equation (3.3) is not ideal. However, when estimating a model similar to the one
described in Equation (3.1), which include a time trend rather than time fixed effect, on a sample of
hospitals with excess capacity only, I find again no indications of any response.
25The potential implications of marginal heterogeneous costs were discussed in Appendix Section A3.
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hospital payment scheme, it may be difficult to estimate effects of their true incentives.
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. Prospective, activity-
based prices are used in many countries to give hospitals incentives to contain costs. Critics
argue that hospitals may be inclined to attract profitable patients, and to lower the quality
for a given patient. This paper’s findings suggest less concern for perverse incentives within
systems similar to that of Norway, and are consistent with a model in which physicians
act as agents for the patients. Nonetheless, the results imply that the current payment
policy yields little scope for policymakers to affect the provision of healthcare.
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Appendix
A1 Details on the price recalibration made by the Norwegian Direc-
torate of Health
The Norwegian Directorate of Health receives account data from a sample of hospitals.
These data are grouped by the following cost categories (Helsedirektoratet, 2011b):
1. Fixed, by hospital department
2. Direct costs related to care, by hospital department
3. Surgery
4. Intensive care
5. X-ray
6. Laboratory work
7. Pharmaceuticals
When splitting DRGs into separate groups for inpatients and outpatients, The Directorate
of Health employed data from year 2007, and used discretion in the choice of relative
weights for the cost categories. Categories (1), (2) and (7) were weighted by 0.5 for
outpatient groups. Moreover, the costs related to surgery (category (3)) were set based
on the lowest costs within the original diagnosis group. Costs related to care (category
(2)) were given 0.1 points per days at the hospital, hence 0.5*0.1=0.05 per outpatient
admission. Outpatient DRGs were not given costs related to category (4), (5) and (6).
The recalibration was budget neutral at the aggregate level, but caused distortions at
the hospital level. (In particular, hospitals mainly focusing on outpatients would yield
relatively less reimbursement).
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A2 Descriptive statistics
Table A2.1 describes the estimation sample. Analogous to the decrease in the share
staying longer than one day, the average length of stay has decreased throughout the
study period. The patient background indicators age, female and number of secondary
diagnoses are fairly stable over the period; so are the patient health indicators: 30-days
and 90-days emergency readmission rate and 1-year re-surgery. Re-surgery is defined as
the readmission of a patient within the same surgical diagnosis group for which she was
initially admitted.
The patient safety indicators have very low sample averages; i.e. operative and post-
operative complications, hospital-acquired infections, and sentinel events, are extremely
rare. These indicators are computed using secondary diagnosis codes following Dro¨sler
(2008) (see also, e.g. Kittelsen et al., 2015). The full set of diagnosis codes used to
construct these measures are described in Table A2.2.
The number of hospitals decrease throughout the time period studied due to a fall in
the number of private hospitals. However, private institutions are small, such that this
decrease amounts to less than 2% of the patient volume.26
There are in total 20 diagnosis groups, 11 in high price change groups and 9 in low
price change groups.
Table A2.1: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Length of stay 3.27 3.06 3.01 2.88 2.65
Female 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53
Comorbidities 0.78 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.73
Age 54.0 53.9 54.1 54.3 54.3
30d emg readm 0.080 0.091 0.088 0.099 0.096
90d emg readm 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12
1-year resurgery 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.43
Complications 0.0070 0.0062 0.0069 0.0062 0.0064
Infections 0.0010 0.00098 0.00082 0.0011 0.00088
Sentinel events 0.000047 0.000074 0.000027 0.000045 0.000027
Hospitals 50 51 51 47 49
Notes: Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample.
26Entry and exit into the market is regulated, and private hospitals are not allowed to offer any treatment
they like. To make sure entry and exits for reasons unrelated to the price change affects the estimates, I
also estimate an alternative model where I group all private hospitals together (as hospitals enter through
the hospital-diagnosis fixed effects). This does not appreciably affect any results (available upon request).
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Table A2.2: Quality indicators
Patient Safety Indicator ICD10-codes
Hospital-acquired infections
Infection due to medical care PSI7 T802, T827, T880
Decubitus ulcer PSI3 L89
Operative and post-operative complications
Complications of anaesthesia PSI1 Y48, Y653
Postoperative hip fracture PSI8 S720, S722, S721
Postoperative pulmonary embolism (PE) or
deep vein thrombosis (DVT)
PSI2 I260, I269, I828, I829, I80
Postoperative sepsis PSI13 A40, A41, R578, T811
Technical difficulty with procedure PSI15 Y60, T812
Postoperative respiratory failure PSI11 J960
Iatrogenic pneumothorax PSI6 J95
Sentinel events
Transfusion reaction PSI16 T803, T804, Y650
Foreign body left in during procedure PSI5 T815, T816, Y61
Notes: Definitions for patient safety indicators (PSIs) are taken from Dro¨sler (2008).
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A3 Price incentives
This section discusses the price incentives implied by the policy change in presence of
marginal costs for staying an additional day, and focus on behavior along the intensive
margin. Let profits pitj(los) in period t ∈ (0, 1) for diagnosis j be a function of length of
stay los, where los ∈ (1, 2). MCj(⊥ t) is the marginal cost of staying an additional day at
the hospital; costs related to initial surgery are abstracted from. Table A3.1 shows profits
for stays lasting two days pitj(2) and one day pi
t
j(1), before (t = 0) and after (t = 1) the
policy change.
Table A3.1: Profits before and after policy change
Before (t = 0) After (t = 1) ∆
pitj(2) pj −MCj pj −MCj pj − pj
pitj(1) pj pj pj − pj
pitj(2)− pitj(1) −MCj pj − pj −MCj pj − pj
Notes: Price incentives induced by the policy change.
Consider a profit maximizing hospital, and assume first a situation in which there is
only one diagnosis j. Before the policy change, the hospital should never let the patient
stay an additional day, because pi0j (1) > pi
0
j (2) as long as MCj > 0. After the policy
change, the patient is shifted to a two-days stay if pi1j (2) > pi
1
j (1)⇒ pj − pj > MCj .
Now consider two types of diagnosis groups, j ∈ (A,B). The hospital should choose
los = 2 for type A rather than B if (i) a two-days stay for patient A is profitable:
pitA(2) > pi
t
A(1), (A3.1)
and (ii) a two-days stay for patient A is more profitable than a two-days stay for patient
B:
pitA(2)− pitA(1) > pitB(2)− pitB(1). (A3.2)
Prior to the policy change, Equation (A3.1) reduces to −MCA > 0, while Equation
(A3.2) yields
−MCA > −MCB
⇒MCB > MCA
(A3.3)
Now, presumably MCA > 0, hence Equation (A3.1) is not satisfied. More generally, since
MCj > 0, the hospital should not retain any patient.
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After the policy change, hospitals should retain type A if (from (A3.1)):
pA − pA > MCA, (A3.4)
and (from Equation (A3.2)):
pA − pA −MCA > pB − pB −MCB
⇒
(
pA − pA
)
−
(
pB − pB
)
> MCA −MCB
(A3.5)
The empirical section implicitly assumes that Equation (A3.4) holds, and moreover,
that MCA = MCB. In that case, Equation (A3.5) implies hospitals should choose los = 2
for patient A rather than B if pA − pA > pB − pB.
In reality, however, it may be the case that MCA > MCB. If so, the profit maximizing
choice could be to let patient B rather than patient A stay for two days.
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A4 Additional results
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Figure A4.1: Overall probability of staying longer than one day.
Figure plots the probability of staying longer than one day, purged of hospital-diagnosis fixed effects.
Sample means are added back in to facilitate interpretation of the axes.
Table A4.1: Effects of policy change on admission volume
Log Volume
(1) (2) (3)
Post -0.042 -0.052 -0.043
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048)
Linear time trend X X X
Quadratic time trend X X
Patient controls X
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.1). Models include fixed effects for hospital-diagnosis.
Linear time trend is included in column (1), column (2) additionally adds a quadratic time trends, while
and patient age, gender and number of secondary diagnoses are included in column (3). Standard errors
clustered at the hospital level; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Figure A4.2: Probability of patients staying longer than one day.
Panel (a) plots the probability of staying longer than one day by size of the price change (above vs below
median price change), purged of year and hospital-diagnosis fixed effects. Panel (b) plots the probability
of staying longer than one day by hospitals’ bed occupancy rate (above vs below median occupancy rate,
i.e. low vs high excess capacity), purged of year and hospital-diagnosis fixed effects. Sample means are
added back in to facilitate interpretation of the axes.
Table A4.2: Effects of price changes on patient stays longer than one day - alternative
definitions of treatment
Length of stay>1 day N/Dep.mean
(1) (2)
Above/below median (baseline) 0.011 [-.009, .031] 546,383
p-value 0.27 0.545
Top/bottom quartile 0.033 [-.035, .069] 256,511
p-value 0.12 0.748
Linear price change 0.011 [-.013, .034] 546,383
p-value 0.41 0.545
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2) with alternative treatment indicators: top vs bottom
quartile price change, and linear price. Models include fixed effects for year and hospital-diagnosis. p-
values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild
bootstrap method (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A4.4: Effects of price changes on patient health
(1) (2) (3)
30-day emg readm 90-day emg readm 1-year re-surgery
HighPrice 0.00413 0.000447 0.00828
95% CI [-.01255, .01553] [-.0118, .008835] [-.01997, .03575]
p-value 0.51 0.92 0.58
Dep. mean 0.0908 0.114 0.439
PSI (operative compl.) PSI (infections) PSI (sentinel events)
HighPrice -0.000154 0.0000448 0.0000367
95% CI [-.00144, .001336] [-.000418, .0005856] [-.00007503, .0001599]
p-value 0.85 0.87 0.48
Dep. mean 0.00656 0.000954 0.0000439
N 546,383 546,383 546,383
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2). Table shows the effect of high price changes (above
vs below median price change) on measures of patient health. All models include fixed effects for year
and hospital-diagnosis. Diagnosis-specific time trends are included in column (2), and controls for age,
gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated
by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild bootstrap method (Cameron and Miller, 2015;
Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table A4.3: Effects of price changes on the log number of patients
Log Volume
(1) (2) (3)
HighPrice× post 0.005 0.031 0.005
95% CI [-0.109, 0.122] [-0.088, 0.142] [-0.088, 0.151]
p-value 0.93 0.62 0.62
Linear diagnosis group time trend X
Patient controls X
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2). Table shows the effect of high price changes (above vs
below median price change) on the number of admitted patients. All models include fixed effects for year
and hospital-diagnosis. Diagnosis-specific time trends are included in column (2), and controls for age,
gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). p-values and 95% confidence intervals are calculated
by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild bootstrap method (Cameron and Miller, 2015;
Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A4.5: Effects of policy change on admission volume by bed capacity
Log volume
(1) (2) (3)
ExcessCapacity × post -0.035 -0.036 -0.035
(0.083) (0.084) (0.072)
Linear hospital time trend X
Patient controls X
Observations 546,383 546,383 546,383
Dependent mean 0.545 0.545 0.545
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.3). Table shows the effect of excess capacity (below vs
above median bed occupancy rate) on the number of admitted patients. All models include fixed effects
for year and hospital-diagnosis. Hospital-specific time trends are included in column (2), and controls for
age, gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). Robust standard errors clustered at the hospital
level; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
Table A4.6: Elective admissions: Effects of price changes on patient stays longer than
one day
Length of stay>1 day
(1) (2) (3)
HighPrice× Post -0.001 -0.005 0.006
95% CI [-0.026, 0.014] [-0.030, 0.012] [-0.012, 0.020]
p-value 0.92 0.56 0.59
Linear diagnosis time trend X
Patient controls X
Observations 546,383 546,383 546,383
Dependent mean 0.394 0.394 0.394
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2) on a sample of elective patients. Table shows the effect
of high price changes (above vs below median price change) on staying longer than one day at the hospital.
All models include fixed effects for year and hospital-diagnosis. Diagnosis-specific time trends are included
in column (2), and controls for age, gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). p-values and
95% confidence intervals are calculated by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild bootstrap
method (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table A4.7: Elective admissions: Effects of price changes on the log number of patients
Log Volume
(1) (2) (3)
HighPrice -0.022 0.029 -0.021
95% CI [-0.146, 0.104] [-0.128, 0.193] [-0.143, 0.106]
p-value 0.73 0.71 0.76
Linear diagnosis group time trend X
Patient controls X
Notes: Results from estimation of Equation (3.2) on a sample of elective patients. Table shows the effect
of high price changes (above vs below median price change) on staying longer than one day at the hospital.
All models include fixed effects for year and hospital-diagnosis. Diagnosis-specific time trends are included
in column (2), and controls for age, gender and comorbidities are added in column (3). p-values and
95% confidence intervals are calculated by clustering at the diagnosis group level using the wild bootstrap
method (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Roodman, 2015); * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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